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CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. By Robert Wyness Millar. New York:
Law Center of New York University, 1952. Pp. xvi, 534, $7.50.
Published under the auspices of the National Conference of Judicial
Councils as the eighth study of the Judicial Administration Series,' this
volume undertakes to survey in historical context "the major procedural
rules employed [in civil proceedings] in the courts of first instance of this
country and England." The selection of an author to undertake a work of
such compass could not have been easy. The choice of Professor Millar
was fortunate. With a background of many years of research in the field
of procedural history against which to draw, Professor Millar has met the
challenge of his assignment with distinction.
After a somewhat too brief opening comment on selected general aspects of procedural development, Professor Millar treats, in twenty chapters,
as many specific phases of trial court procedure and practice. No attempt
to summarize the material in this volume could do justice to its scope. An
indication of the range of the study is sufficient for a review. Following a
short account of the steps in the fusion of law-equity administration, the
author discusses, in roughly the order in which they unfold in normal civil
litigation, such topics as commencement of the action, service of process,
joinder of parties and claims, pleading, discovery, pre-trial proceedings,
jury and non-jury trial, judgment, trial court review of judgments, and
execution. Each subject has its own story of development and change: a
story which the author sets against the background of classic common-law
and equity practice, with frequent sidelights from continental procedure;
which he then traces through the mutations of successive reform; and which
he rounds out with an account of the present practice in the Anglo-American
courts. To this is added, where deemed appropriate, statements of the
author's judgment as to the merits or demerits of the contemporaneous
practice and the desirable course of future development of the particular
technique under study.
Such a work has substantial value in its contribution to breaching the
invisible barrier so often thrown up by lawyers against interstate commerce in procedural ideas. The inertia of most lawyers toward procedural
reform has been notorious. No doubt this inertia has numerous sources,
but none more influential than lack of knowledge.
1. Prior volumes of the series are:

POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS; HAYNES,

THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES; PouND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL
CASES; ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL; ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
APPEALS IN AMERICA; WARREN, TRAFFIC COURTS; VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
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"Most of the time we take ourselves for granted, as we have to, and
live on a little knowledge about ourselves as we were." 2
So most of us, as lawyers, manipulate our available procedural tools in our
daily practice, ordinarily with little concern for the source or background
of a particular instrument, and even less for the manner in which another
jurisdiction may have reshaped or superseded it in the interest of a more
efficient administration of justice. Professor Millar's study strikes at the
foundation of unenlightenment that contributes so much to such professional
insularity.
In supplying, in readable length, so broad a cross-section of our procedure, the author obviously could not explore the details of local practice. I suspect, therefore, that a reader expert in the practice of a particular state is apt to find occasions to quarrel with particulars in the text.
To choose examples, I would go to the Texas practice, with which I happen to be especially familiar. Doing so, I note the omission of that state
from the enumeration of those having summary judgment rules (p. 249),
and those which have adopted rules incorporating Federal Rule 42(b)
(p. 275). I observe the statement that in Texas the demand for jury
must be made in open court (p. 249), a requirement eliminated in 1949.
I question the implied attribution to Missouri of the development of an
"expedient" of presumed findings in support of the judgment, after trial by
the court, where findings were not made on particular fact issues (p. 352).
The Missouri amendment of 1943 was antedated by a rule having similar
effect in the Texas Rules of 1941. I am disturbed by the overly broad statement that the bill of review is "provided for in Texas" (p. 400), citing
a rule, applicable to certain district courts, which states merely that bills
of review are available in those courts. In Texas the bill of review practice
is not "provided for" by a rule: it is established by long usage and merely
recognized in the rule cited. Let it be emphasized, however, that these are
minutiae. I cite them to illustrate that this text does not in every instance
correctly state the details of local practice. But one does not read it to
learn the practice of his own state. He reads it to witness the surge of
procedural development, an historical study which in its overall picture is
not marred by individual aberrations.
I did miss citations to the legal periodicals during the past dozen years.
A review of 500 pages containing footnotes turned up references to only
four articles published since 1940. While I have not combed the Index of
Legal Periodicals, I find it rather hard to believe that in all the legal
periodicals distributed in this period, there were pertinent to the subjects in
this volume only four articles of sufficient value to merit citation. I value
footnotes as a starting point for additional research on a point in which I
develop a special interest. For the remoter past, I am prepared happily to
accept a minimum citation of authority. But my interest, and I suspect
that of most lawyers, in going beyond the text, is primarily to explore what
2. T. S.

ELIOT, THE COCKTAIL PARTY,

Act I, Scene 1.
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has happened in recent years. In this respect, the text seems to me to fall
short.
The author fortunately has stated freely his views concerning our
present practice in its various aspects. This is wholly fitting. A historical
survey has pragmatic value only as it affords the reader assistance in the
formulation of judgments as to the failures of present techniques and as
to changes which are most likely to minimize such failures. While the
author's conclusions may not always win immediate acceptance, the reader
is entitled to know and weigh the judgments of one whose vast historical
knowledge is compiled in a study of this type. Here those views are
repeatedly made known. I do not recommend their blanket acceptance,
though I personally found few with which to quibble. What I do say is
that such opinions cannot be lightly disregarded, and that the recommendations, if followed, could not fail to improve the administration of justice
in many states.
The book is not perfect, but its faults are superficial. Moreover, they
are probably inevitable in the treatment of so much in so little space, and
hence are excusable. The book is one that should be read by every lawyer
whose interest is in improving the workings of his courts; it is a "must"
for thdse whose public service opens to them an opportunity directly to
contribute to such improvement.
Roy W. McDonaldt

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. By Urban A. Lavery.
St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. xii, 518, $12.00.
Until relatively recently, the most salient thing about American administrative law was its lack of detailed doctrinal writings. In part, this
was due to the newness of the field and the fact that it was in too great a
state of flux to lend itself to systematic textual treatment. Yet, important
though these factors doubtless are, of themselves, they do not account
for the lack of treatises on administrative law in this country. More significant has been the attitude of the common lawyer toward the subject.
Under the influence of what Mr. Justice Frankfurter has termed the "misconceptions and myopia" 1 of A. V. Dicey, Anglo-American legal thought
reacted to the growth of modern administrative law in an ostrichlike manner. In Dicey's view, administrative law was opposed to the first principles
of the English Constitution, and he accordingly denied its very existence in
the commnon-law world. "In England, and in the countries which, like the
United States, derive their civilization from English sources, the system of
t Member of the United States, Texas and New York Bars.
sor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. Foreword, 47

YALE

L.J. 515, 517 (1938).
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administrative law and the very principles upon which it rests are in truth
unknown." 2
The chief consequence of the Diceian view has been the absence in the
past of any real attempt at systematization and synthesis of the field of
administrative law by Anglo-American doctrinal writers. This is most
striking, especially when one contrasts it with the situation that has existed
with regard to other branches of our law. If one has sought to solve a
problem-no matter how piddling-arising in a field of private law, he
might turn to a plethora of texts to aid him. But let his case have referred
to the relations of the administration and the citizen and there has been an
almost complete dearth of doctrinal writing. As recently stated in a work
seeking to explain the fundamentals of the American system to a civil-law
audience, "an over-all account of administrative law does not yet exist in
contemporary American literature." 3
The situation just described has, however, in large part, become a
thing of the past. The past three years have seen the publication of a number of treatises on American administrative law. The most significant of
them has been the treatise of Professor Davis, 4 which represents the first
attempt to treat in some detail all of the problems which are considered
in this country to pertain to administrative law. The publication of these
recent works has been made possible only by the rejection of American
jurists of the Diceian denial of the existence of administrative law and by
its recognition instead as an established rubric of our law. Their appearance indicates that administrative law in this country has attained a certain
degree of growth and maturity. The period of synthesis and systematization
is now at hand.
The book being reviewed-the most recent of American treatises on administrative law-is clearly intended to aid in the process of systematization
of the subject. At its very beginning, the author informs us, using for the
purpose a passage from John Stuart Mill, "This book makes no pretense
of giving to the world a new theory of intellectual operations. Its claim
to attention, if it possesses any, is grounded on the fact that it is an attempt
. . . to embody and systematize the best ideas on its subject."
Certainly, Mr. Lavery's treatise is not, nor is it intended to be, as comprehensive in scope as, for example, Davis on Administrative Law. Nor
is this due to the fact that its coverage is expressly limited to the federal
field, for that is true of most other administrative law works as well. Even
that by Davis, it should be noted, is, for all practical purposes, primarily a
text on the federal law. Mr. Lavery's aim appears to be somewhat more limited than that of the other recent writers in the field. His goal is not to present a critical treatment of the major problems of federal administrative law.
His work is intended essentially as a summary, more than as a critique, and
2. DicEy, LAW
3. SCHWARTZ,

(1952).
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of only certain aspects, rather than as an overall treatise on the subject.
The author's statement inhis Preface that the book attempts to "provide
an overall treatise on the Practice and Application of Federal Administrative Law" is consequently somewhat misleading. Actually, the scope of
the book is much less broad, since it contains essentially a discussion of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act and of federal administrative rule
making.
The book is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to a
treatment of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. After discussing
the background of the Act, the author seeks to analyze its provisions in
numerical order. Much of this analysis is devoted to materials derived
from the reports of the Senate and House Committees on the bills which
evolved into the Procedure Act. However valuable these may be as starting
points, it is to be feared that as the "be all and end all" of an explanation
of the Act they leave much to be desired. This reviewer, at any rate, would
have greatly preferred a critical account by the author himself of the Act's
provisions, their advantages, and defects. It is true also of such a statute
that mere exegesis of a fundamental text is not the way to obtain the most
accurate picture of its actual meaning and effect. A discussion, for example,
of the portions of the Act setting up a system of hearing examiners which
refers mainly to the materials in the legislative history of the law, without
any treatment of the way in which they have worked out in practice, is
bound to suffer from incompleteness. The breakdown in operation thus far
of the examiner system intended by the Procedure Act is of at least as great
importance as the provisions of the Act themselves.
The second part of the Lavery book is devoted to what is essentially
a listing of the 100 major federal agencies, with a brief mention of their
historical origins and their statutory authority and purposes. Such a compendium is undoubtedly useful to those seeking a summary picture of the
federal administration. One wonders, however, whether its place is in a
present-day treatise of this type devoted to federal administrative law.
What appears to this reviewer to constitute the most valuable portion
of Mr. Lavery's work is its third part, which is devoted to the subject of
achninistrative rule making. This is a subject which is all too frequently
overlooked by students of administrative law, despite its obvious importance
to those affected by agency regulation. The author's viewpoint is well
expressed in his characterization of the situation today as the "wilderness"
of our federal regulations. This is primarily caused by the sheer bulk of
agency rules-what Lavery terms the "uncontrolled flood of agency regulations," which will, according to his estimates, have reached some 480,000
pages by 1960. It is at the production end of the business of administrative
rule making that the trouble really lies. And until some restraint in the
matter of volume and loquacity is exercised by the agencies, little improvement can be hoped for. The Federal Register Act, the Code of Federal
Regulations and the public information provisions in section 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, valuable though they may be, are, in the
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author's view, only first steps to bring the vast field of administrative lawmaking under control. What is needed now, he says, is for Congress to
provide for a genuine codification of all agency rules and for such "Code"
to be kept up to date. Congress must itself take over the legislative responsibility for such a "Code," as it did for the Statutes at large in the United
States Code of 1926.
When a law professor fathers a book, to paraphrase a recent statement by Circuit judge Dobie, lawyers are prone to criticize it as being interesting and stimulating yet utterly impractical. When the author is a
practising lawyer, the professors turn the tables by insisting that the book
possesses mechanical utility but altogether lacks logical symmetry,
philosophical consistency, and any profound or penetrating scholarship. 5
It cannot be denied that there is much truth in Judge Dobie's remark.
Thus, the present reviewer is bound to suffer from the bias of the academic
jurist in his reactions to the work of a practising lawyer like Mr. Lavery.
His aim, as he himself expresses it, is not to write a comprehensive critical
treatise, but to furnish the practising lawyer with a useful and adequate
desk-book covering those aspects of federal administrative law dealt with by
him. At the same time, however, one may question whether the work
would not have been more valuable had a broader approach been followed.
In a field such as administrative law, critique is even more important than
summary. The critical views of a practitioner of Mr. Lavery's stature
would have proved more useful than his present exegetic reliance on
authority.
Bernard Schwartz t

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. By Rinehart J. Swenson.
New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1952. Pp. iv, 376, $6.00.
In spite of the appearance of several more or less comprehensive texts
on administrative law in the last few years, workers and students in the field
had long endured, theretofore, a dearth of useful texts. As a result they
are disposed to welcome joyously a new book such as Swenson's, even
though it purports to deal only with federal administrative law, and to ask
questions about it only afterward. That afterward has now come, for
obviously reviewing time is not only questioning time, but also questionanswering time. The first answer is that we should still welcome the book,
although it may make some of us furious.
At the outset, readers of a book on federal administrative law might
look for a unified and detailed treatment of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946. It will not be found. Pertinent provisions of that Act are
cited in connection with discussions of various subject matters dealt with
5. Dobie, Book Review, 39 VA. L. REv. 135, 137 (1953).
'I Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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by it, but the book will hardly serve as a convenient instrument for study
of the Act as a matter of special interest. But the book has other values,
as will appear.
Meanwhile, an observation of the author about the general character of
the Act requires mention and some comment. For some of us the observation is irritating. On pages 121-122 the author states: "This is a lawyer's
law, conceived by lawyers and dedicated to the proposition that justice is
the exclusive business of lawyers. . ..
The provision for citizen participation in rule making gives almost unlimited opportunity for sabotage,
and the extension of judicial review may give so many citizens so many
days in court that the government will have very few days out of court." 1
It appears to be something less than objective to account for this important
and vastly beneficent, though far from perfect, legislation as merely the
product of a selfish service of self by the legal profession. It should be
added that it is not apparent, in connection with public participation in rule
making,' how the requirement that the "bureaucrats" come out of their
"ivory towers" to the extent of considering the written views of those interested in and affected by proposed rules can sabotage anything. That
practice was advocated as long ago (1932) as the report of the English
Committee on Ministers Powers, and it was a practice extensively followed
in the federal field on a voluntary basis prior to the adoption of the Act.
Certainly the practice has much to commend it; this is true especially when
its use cannot effectively obstruct the making of rules which are appropriate
or necessary. The author's implied criticism of judicial review is unfair.
At least he should have indicated that much that is favorable can be and has
been said about judicial review generally and about the judicial review
provisions of the Act.
But the book in numerous respects is too good to justify detailed
examination here of the enthusiasms, overenthusiasms, and biases of the
author. The foregoing should be warning enough that at times the author
is willing to invite the reader to follow him far out on a limb, instead of
cautioning the reader that in many controverted matters there may be or
is a different view which is reasonable.
As to scope, the book deals with the growth, nature and control of
administrative action. The first chapter deals largely, and adequately
enough, with the actual fact of "big government." Chapter 2 deals with
fitting this factual situation into the legal one, particularly the constitutional
one relating to separation of powers. By ranging through political writings
and views from the "one power" to the "five power" theories, the author
does a fine job of opening the minds of those who have assumed that the
Montesquieu "three power" type of government is the only possible kind.
He also develops the idea that the three power system is both delusive and
unworkable and in fact under the pressures of the necessities of modern
1. See also page 307 where the author quotes with evident high approval a charge,
somewhat similar, except that it out-Swensons Swenson.
2. See Section 4 of the Act.
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government, has not prevented the union of all of the kinds of governmental
power in many administrative bodies. The treatment of the matter of
standards is also sophisticated. The problem of uncertainty in standards is
well illustrated, not only by the "war emergency" cases but also in nonemergency situations such as that in American Power & Light Company v.
Securities and Exchange Commission.3
Chapter 3 purports to deal with The Administrative Process. But
while constitutional and statutory requirements in regard to rule making
and adjudication are considered, the chapter has several defects. The
difficulties of distinguishing in many situations between rule making and
adjudication seem to be dealt with inadequately. The ancillary investigative
and prosecutive powers, as well as the public information and reporting
functions, are largely ignored. As to rule making and adjudication, requirements of notice and hearing are developed, although somewhat scantily.
Quite usefully, the need for clarifying the law in regard to res judicata is
demonstrated. Notably lacking is any adequate treatment of post-hearing
(including decisional) matters at the agency level.
Chapter 4 deals with the Enforcement of Administrative Action. It
contains a good analysis of the illogic, however politic, of denying the contempt power to administrators. There is an adequate summary of the
consequent necessity for court enforcement. Investigation and enforcement of subpenas are dealt with here, although it seems they should have
been considered along with other "processes" in chapter 3.
The Doctrine of State Immunity from liability for the acts of its officers
is the subject of chapter 5. In connection with consent to liability, some
consideration is given to the work of the Court of Claims and to the Tort
Claims Act. Several excursions into the state field are made to round out
the treatment. A strong plea is made for more extensive curtailing of the
doctrine of "state irresponsibility."
The Liability of Public Officers is considered in chapter 6. This
chapter, includes a good analysis of the problems arising when the offensive
official action is discretionary or "judicial," and the analogy to the immunity of judges is developed. The acute problem of official action under
an unconstitutional statute is extensively considered. Mention is made of
the opportunity for avoiding risk in doubtful cases by the official's obtaining a declaratory judgment.
Judicial review and its limitations are dealt with in chapters 7 and 8.
In considering the theory of judicial review, Parliamentary supremacy in
Britain is contrasted briefly with our system of judicial supremacy, and the
anomaly is noted that under our system the courts are required to "assimilate to the judicial function the power to govern" (page 214). Reference to the French system of administrative independence might have served
to round out the treatment of this aspect of separation of powers. As to
scope of review, there is a good treatment of the problem of administrative
finality in cases presenting "mixed" questions of law and fact and in cases
3. 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
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involving "constitutional" and "jurisdictional" facts. The treatment of the
substantial evidence rule is comparatively extensive, clear and good. The
criticism of judicial review of rule making is worthy of thoughtful
consideration.
Chapter 9, entitled Government by Agency or Government by Lawsuit,
is devoted to an examination, with administrative reform possibilities in
mind, of both the benefits and the dangers of government by administration
which is often of a discretionary character, as compared to government by
rule. The point is made and stressed that government by agency is better
adapted to the protection of "public rights," in connection with which large
policy areas are encountered, whereas courts are generally ill equipped to
determine policy. The objective-minded student of this subject will find
much to interest him in this chapter. At any rate, we have come to use
both discretion and the rule of law as instruments for coordinated governmental action. Lawyers who have resisted the increased use of the administrative technique (and the author seems to assume that nearly all of
them do-) and favor subjecting the "far-reaching policies of government"
to the "narrow, individual, and legalistic procedure" of the "lawsuit method
of evaluation" are severely castigated, and not without a number of gratuitous side-swipes at the legal profession as a whole.
Chapter 10, the final chapter, considers Congressional Supervision of
the Federal Administrative Process, and covers matters usual to such a
heading. In addition it stresses the useful and perhaps often-neglected idea
that'the congressional investigation is itself a powerful instrument of
control.
What now about the book as a whole? In spite of unevenness, some
omissions, and various biases (which may, perhaps, be largely forgiven in
so controversial a field) it is believed that the book will have a large value to
those who wish to explore the pros and cons of one of the most important
legal and governmental developments of our time. However, neither student nor practitioner should rely on it exclusively. Others, who have already explored, even if they disagree with the author on many points (and
many doubtless will) should nevertheless be thankful for this book.
Charles H. Kinnane t
t Professor of Law, De Paul University.

